The text is taken from the first issue of the journal “Centar” of the CSPR RS

1. Professor Tanasković, what led you to focus your interests on the complex relations between the Christian and Muslim worlds?

My, so to speak, interests in Islamic and religious studies originate from philology. During my eight years of schooling at the Classical Gymnasium in Serbia—which, unfortunately, was abolished long ago—we learned the significance of language for all human culture, as well as the fact that philology is far broader and more complex than pure linguistics; it is an interdisciplinary field of intellectual and creative activity. Later, while studying Oriental philology, I noticed the inseparable connection—especially in Islam—between philology and theology, and realized that without knowledge of the Qur’an and Islamic religious teachings, it is impossible to understand not only the cultural but also the social existence of Muslim communities. When Islam, as is often said, “entered the political scene” in our region during the period leading up to the breakup of Yugoslavia, my Islamic studies priorities inevitably shifted toward sociological and political topics. In that context, it became natural for me to devote myself to attempting as objective an illumination as possible of the relations between Christians and Muslims, since this constitutes an important segment of our shared destiny in the life space assigned to us.

2. What do you think the future of Europe and Muslims in it will be?

While serving as ambassador to the Holy See, I had the fortune of having an extended conversation with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI. The topic was the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union. The great theologian had earlier made a statement, which resonated widely, that the inclusion of Turkey in the EU would be antihistorical and disastrous if the EU wishes to remain Europe, in the sense of fundamental and traditional European values. Since then, Turkey’s accession process has remained largely stalled, and the country has become more distant from EU integration for several political and strategic reasons.

3. As a professional linguist, how much have your linguistic research and knowledge helped you in your later academic work, as well as in the diplomatic field?

What philology has meant to me, and in the broadest sense continues to mean, is something I have already emphasized in response to your first question: it has allowed me to approach the world as a great Text. Linguistic training—above all, knowledge of several languages, and thereby also of the cultures (“literatures”) mediated through those languages—has been of invaluable help both in my academic work and, even more directly, in diplomacy. For a modern diplomat, knowledge of English is assumed, and ideally one more so-called “world language,” while mastery of the language of the country of accreditation is both desirable and immensely useful. If a diplomat specializes in a particular narrow or broader region, the scope of work requires knowledge of the dominant language(s) of that geopolitical space. Language opens even those political and mental doors that seem closed. For example, if a Serbian diplomat in Slovenia or North Macedonia does not content himself with the fact that his local interlocutors mostly understand him when he speaks his mother tongue, but makes the effort to learn Slovenian or Macedonian, he has already completed half of the diplomatic work.

4. As a recognized expert on Turkish affairs, can you tell us whether present-day Turkey is a divided state?

All states and societies are marked by various internal divisions, and Turkey is no exception in this regard. However, despite some more pronounced fault lines—ethnic (Turkish-Kurdish), religious (Sunni-Alevi), ideological (Islamist-secularist), and so on—at the state level Turkey is impressively homogeneous. Turks, by and large, are staunch patriots. They respect the national anthem, the flag and the pledge to the homeland, which represents a significant comparative advantage and an asset on which Turkish state policy can rely in international relations.

5. What, in your opinion, will be the role of the Kurds in the future of Turkish-Israeli relations?

Turkish-Israeli relations will never be genuinely friendly. At best, they can develop into a form of pragmatic engagement, as has occurred during certain periods. In this context, the Kurdish factor will constantly be attractive to the Israeli side as a lever for indirect or direct pressure on Ankara, particularly within the coordinates of the complex regional context and its ever-present broader internationalization.

6. You recently co-authored, together with Professor Nenad Kecmanović, the book Alija, ulema or balija?, produced in collaboration with the Public Institution CSPR of the Republic of Srpska. How important is scientific and professional research today on topics such as those addressed in this book?

Classical historiography has established the standard that only events and phenomena for which there exists a so-called “historical distance” can be examined scientifically in a positive sense, allowing for more enduring and reliable conclusions. This is certainly cautious and fundamentally correct. However, it is mistaken to absolutize this view, and especially to misuse it as a way of denying the possibility and purpose of issuing critical judgments on contemporary events based on the facts available. After all, on what else, besides first-rate source material, will future scholarship base its research if not also on contemporary testimonies regarding past topics it studies? At times, denying the validity of serious contemporary testimonies is a calculated way of exerting influence to eliminate undesirable narratives and shape desirable ones projected to remain effective in the future. For this reason, it is important to strive to process events and phenomena as objectively as possible, particularly those that are controversial but had undeniable significance in their time. Alija Izetbegović, both as a person and as a phenomenon, in his own way marked a turbulent period of what will one day become the history of these lands. I believe the logic with which the work of the Public Institution CSPR of the Republic of Srpska was programmatically conceived demonstrates an understanding of this social necessity.

7. Could you tell us a bit more about the influence of neo-Ottomanism on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the countries in the region?

Neo-Ottomanism refers to Turkey’s strategic doctrine, whose goal is for the successor of the Ottoman Empire to once again become a great power and one of the most influential states in the world by all available means and avenues. Geopolitically, one of Turkey’s three Eurasian priorities includes the Middle East, the Caucasus/Central Asia, and the Balkans. The Balkans are particularly important to Ankara because they represent the vector of neo-Ottoman outreach toward Europe. For this reason, actions based on neo-Ottomanism in Balkan countries must always be approached with vigilance and a thorough understanding of the context. This is especially true for states where compact, indigenous Muslim communities reside, as they constitute the basic population and socio-cultural footholds of Turkey’s “strategic depth”—a term introduced in the neo-Ottoman lexicon by Ahmet Davutoglu.