The upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, scheduled for late June, could, according to announcements and expectations, represent a key moment for reassessing the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. While new strategic priorities are being formulated, Europe—burdened by internal weaknesses, divisions, and institutional misalignment—is increasingly marked by negative trends, further fueled by accelerated militarization. Divergent approaches to interpreting the “Russian factor”—cited as the primary reason for intensified defense investments and capacity building—are limiting the scope for strategic cohesion and long-term alignment among allied states.

At the same time, the question of Europe’s ability to build its own security policy and institutional stability without external support is being brought back into focus—especially in the context of the United States’ strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific and China. The U.S., traditionally regarded as the guarantor of European security, is prompting growing concern within European circles over a potential reduction of its presence. Although there have been no official confirmations of the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, the narrative of Washington’s reorientation toward the Asia-Pacific region is gaining traction, as evidenced by statements from senior officials, including current U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Undersecretary Elbridge Colby. In this context, scenarios predicting troop withdrawals once again raise the question of who, and in what way, could compensate for the emerging security vacuum in Europe.

According to a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, published in May 2025, which addresses the issue of Europe’s defense in the absence of the United States, it is estimated that the total cost of replacing U.S. capabilities could reach one trillion dollars (1,000 billion) over the next two and a half decades. The estimate includes one-time procurement costs ranging from $226 to $344 billion, as well as additional expenditures for maintenance, personnel, and logistical support—significantly exceeding the current capacities of most European countries. In addition to the financial burden, challenges also arise from the lack of political will among certain member states, as well as public resistance to long-term increases in defense spending, further narrowing the space for systematically strengthening capabilities. Despite rhetoric about “strategic autonomy,” Europe remains fundamentally dependent on American power—not only in military terms, but also in the political and strategic sense.

The European Union’s defense fund, amounting to 150 billion euros and formally adopted on May 27, 2025, under the name Security Action for Europe (SAFE), has been presented as a step toward strengthening Europe’s defense autonomy. SAFE, as a new instrument expanding on the concept of the existing European Defence Fund, enables member states to engage in joint borrowing to finance defense projects, with the requirement that at least 65% of contract value originates from companies based in the EU, the European Economic Area, or Ukraine—all in line with the “Buy European” principle.

Although this initiative is formally part of a broader strategy to enhance self-reliant defense capabilities and reduce dependence on external support, its structure and the current practice of fund allocation suggest that security policies within the EU remain largely aligned with the interests of the United States. Europe continues to significantly rely on American sources of military equipment, technology, and doctrinal support.

Despite the fact that several European countries—such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden—possess developed defense and technological capacities, the essential question remains whether these capabilities are adequate, sufficiently coordinated, complementary, and financially supported to serve as a foundation for genuine technological and operational sovereignty.

Even though the fund is formally placed under the umbrella of the European Commission, leading member states like Germany and France retain de facto control over its distribution—something smaller states understandably perceive as instrumentalization rather than equal cooperation. In this context, the rhetoric of “autonomy” increasingly serves as a façade for the absence of a truly shared vision.

Amid increasingly pronounced institutional and conceptual differences, additional complexity is introduced by political initiatives emerging from within NATO’s own framework. Particularly symptomatic is the declaration of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, adopted on May 26, 2025, during its session in Dayton (USA), which calls for further increases in defense spending and intensified support for Ukraine, along with open appeals for the NATO–Ukraine Council to be actively engaged during the NATO Summit in The Hague. Although this initiative is presented as a sign of unity, it fundamentally reveals the systemic inability of NATO structures to articulate a long-term and inclusive vision of European security. Unity based on a perception of threat—rather than on genuine political consensus—only superficially conceals the growing geopolitical rifts within the Euro-Atlantic space.

An even more challenging issue lies in the competing visions of each country’s role within the emerging European security architecture. Chancellor Merz’s announcement of a “historic strengthening of the Bundeswehr,” coupled with the current deployment of an armored brigade to Lithuania; France’s concept of “European defense sovereignty,” featuring the idea of a nuclear shield and independent command structures; and Poland’s large-scale procurement of weapons and military equipment in an effort to become the backbone of NATO’s eastern flank—all reflect marked differences in strategic approaches.

The United Kingdom, despite being outside the EU, continues to pursue bilateral initiatives, particularly with Nordic and Baltic countries. At the core of these moves—especially in light of a potential reduction in the U.S. military presence—is a struggle to assume a leading security role within Europe. Such a situation generates divergent visions of European security that, rather than building synergy, further deepen institutional and political divides.

The NATO Summit in The Hague will not only serve as an opportunity for military-strategic coordination among Euro-Atlantic partners but also as a mirror reflecting Europe’s actual capacity to define its own role in a rapidly changing world. Without the ability to position itself independently within the international order, and lacking internal coherence necessary for unified action, Europe remains confined to the role of a dependent actor in a geopolitical landscape shaped by others. Instead of a systemic strategy, reactivity, institutional fragmentation, and reliance on external security guarantees continue to prevail.

Without a vision in which Russia is accepted as an integral part of the continental security architecture, any attempt to build a new order rests on the premise of prolonged confrontation. Such an approach does not bring stability; rather, it intensifies internal polarization, hinders the development of an autonomous, functional, and resilient European space, and increases dependency. In this context, the upcoming summit in The Hague represents an opportunity for Europe to demonstrate political maturity and overcome its conceptual dependence on the paradigm of permanent confrontation with Russia.