In a time when the security aspect is once again asserting itself as a key political category, the mindset guiding the European Union’s choices and actions does not indicate a proper understanding of global processes. Moreover, the narrative of strategic and geopolitical autonomy reveals a deep gap between ambition and actual capacity. This is evident in the limited reach of initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of defense (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Indicators of internal weakening further illuminate this gap. Germany’s industrial output, as the Union’s key economic power, has experienced a double-digit decline over the past decade. In addition, the European Union, in its own projections, overlooks the fact that demographic erosion, technological dependence, and political fragmentation fundamentally undermine the very foundations of any credible defense architecture. Furthermore, the emerging security context raises questions about the sustainability of European democratic institutions. Conditions of prolonged instability and crisis favor executive authorities, narrow public discourse, and encourage technocratic and security-driven approaches that escape democratic oversight. In this light, the hypothetical question arises: does Europe today even have a clear understanding of the justification and strategic rationale for the path it is taking, or is it moving in a direction that is the result of decades-long dependency and inertia rather than a deliberate choice? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not encouraging.
The modern European Union stands amidst a whirlwind of changes that directly impact its capacity for defense and power projection. A project that once symbolically represented the promise of lasting peace and stability now faces a fundamental question—whether it even possesses the potential to act effectively in the contemporary world. The decline in industrial production, the unavailability and/or high cost of energy resources, and the loss of a working-age population directly undermine its defense capabilities and, more broadly, the Union’s strategic resilience as a subject in geopolitical relations.
At the same time, energy dependence on external sources—accelerated by current geopolitical developments—represents not only an economic but also a security challenge. Without resolving the issue of energy supply, the sustainability of any defense strategy remains questionable. The geopolitical orientation of the Union, primarily marked by intense distancing from Russia and a pronounced ideological approach, affects not only its foreign policy but also internal narratives. The sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022 have contributed to a significant increase in energy prices across the European Union, further burdening member state economies and weakening their energy stability. Europe is acting less and less in the spirit of realpolitik and balance of interests, increasingly drifting toward ideological positions that are out of step with both the Union’s actual capabilities and its internal cohesion. Although the EU’s security dependence on the United States and NATO continues, new circumstances—from internal divisions to global competition—demand a fundamental reassessment: is strategic autonomy a realistic option, or will Europe remain bound to external guarantees in a world that is increasingly intolerant of passive actors?
Within the Union itself, consensus is becoming increasingly elusive: fundamental differences in member states’ positions on key issues—such as Ukraine, relations with the United States, migration, and security—further complicate the formulation of a common strategy. A telling example is the divide over military aid to Ukraine, where the positions of Hungary and Poland differ significantly. In addition to traditionally influential countries like Germany and France, the internal political rhythm of the EU is increasingly being dictated by the Baltic states and Warsaw—whose approach, shaped by historical fears, deepens divergences and pulls the Union away from a shared vision. This course of action is increasingly taking on the characteristics of political pathology within the EU, as not all member states are equally willing to pursue a path of radicalization in relations, making it even more difficult to formulate a coherent strategy and undermining the very foundations of European cohesion.
The American factor within this security vortex remains crucial and indispensable, even though the future of its presence is uncertain. While the current administration in Washington is increasingly signaling the need to end the conflict in Ukraine through diplomatic mechanisms, certain European countries—particularly the aforementioned Baltic states—continue to encourage the prolongation of the war in Ukraine. These opposing positions and contradictions further complicate transatlantic relations and reveal deep fractures on both the value-based and strategic levels. At the same time, the new economic tariffs imposed by the United States on the EU reinforce the sense of structural dependence and confirm the perception of Europe as a space caught between declarative solidarity and actual economic subordination.
The relationship with China—a global actor that is increasingly influencing both economic and security dynamics—further complicates the security vortex in which Europe finds itself. For Europe, China is simultaneously a vital industrial partner and a geopolitical challenge, particularly in light of the U.S. strategy aimed at curbing Chinese influence. Inconsistencies among EU member states regarding their stance on Beijing further compromise the ability to shape a common foreign and security policy. While part of the continent seeks to maintain stable trade relations, another part embraces the confrontational rhetoric coming from Washington. This ambiguity not only diminishes Europe’s capacity for geopolitical maneuvering but also leaves the EU without a clear strategy in potential conflict scenarios that may involve the Asia-Pacific region or global supply chains. The China issue, therefore, becomes a question of Europe’s very defense orientation in an increasingly unstable global environment.
While the institutions of the European Union focus on issues of global projection, within European societies themselves the most concrete and sensitive challenge is the issue of migration—no longer merely a humanitarian or identity-related matter, but increasingly a primary concern for the strategic and security stability of European societies. A particularly sensitive aspect is the growing demographic disparity between the native population and migrant communities in the more developed EU member states. While the native populations of most member states face a chronic decline in birth rates and an aging demographic, migrant communities are experiencing steady growth—creating an increasingly pronounced demographic imbalance. This demographic imbalance directly affects the personnel base of defense structures—not only in quantitative terms but also in cultural, integrative, and security dimensions.
The continuous influx of migrants, driven by ongoing conflicts, places an added burden on the institutions and security services of EU member states. Instead of a responsible strategy, there is growing social fragmentation, political radicalization, and the emergence of conditions conducive to extremism—including the formation of parallel structures within urban centers. Migration, once perceived as an opportunity to revitalize the workforce, is increasingly seen as a security threat and a destabilizing factor in the context of internal defense. This is evidenced by terrorist attacks in recent years across Western Europe that originated within migrant communities. In addition to quantitative differences in birth rates, qualitative changes in population structure are emerging, leading in some countries to the de facto transformation of their social and cultural composition. In several major European metropolises, trends indicate that migrant populations make up a significant share of younger generations, while in some urban areas there is a relative decline in the presence of the native population. This gradual yet marked transformation of the social fabric—occurring without broad public debate—fosters a sense of insecurity and opens the door to political radicalization, precisely because institutions refuse to address issues that much of the population perceives as existentially important.
The increasingly frequent calls for the militarization of the European Union raise a crucial dilemma: who will form the human foundation of European defense? The lack of interest among younger generations in military service in countries like Germany and France points to a systemic problem. Population aging, declining birth rates, and value systems that do not promote a sense of defense responsibility further narrow an already weakened personnel base for European defense. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that most EU member states are also part of NATO, which entails obligations under Articles 3, 5, and 8 of the Washington Treaty. The latter emphasizes that European defense initiatives must primarily be developed in accordance with existing NATO commitments—thus limiting full autonomous development as long as the United States remains actively engaged in the Alliance.
From this perspective, the current militarization process must also be seen as a response to increasingly assertive demands coming from the United States, such as the push to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP. However, it remains unclear how this demand will be reconciled with the European concept of strategic autonomy in a financially sustainable way. At the same time, key obstacles—from limited manufacturing capacities to technological and raw material dependence—are being overlooked, despite seriously constraining ambitions for an independent defense buildup. This very gap between political ambition and actual capabilities clearly points to the paradox of militarization without a strategic or industrial foundation.
The Balkans most clearly reflect the security and political contradictions of the European strategy—a space where differing approaches and interests collide. Serbia and Republika Srpska remain in an ambivalent position, caught between aspirations for European integration and resistance to global structural shifts. While the European Union exhibits diminishing internal confidence, it simultaneously demands unconditional loyalty from its neighbors—often through pressure rather than equitable dialogue. Demands placed on Serbia—from the recognition of the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo to alignment with sanctions against Russia—are made without a clear vision or long-term guarantees. Such a policy reflects more of a pattern of political conditioning than an attempt to build a sustainable partnership, and it often mirrors a framework that has followed Serbia since the 1990s.
Conversely, the approach to Republic of Srpska reflects an oversimplified perception of the complex constitutional and political reality of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, disregarding internal competences, the principle of constituent peoples, and the Dayton-mandated equality of entities. In both cases, there is a continuation of a Western policy that views the Serbian factor through a lens of containment and pressure, rather than through recognition of its specific context and political equality. This persistent stance toward the Serbian factor suggests a perception of threat rather than a willingness for constructive dialogue. It reflects enduring mistrust and a lack of confidence, preventing the acknowledgment of legitimate interests and undermining the principle of equality that should form the basis of the European approach to the region. Thus, the Balkans do not merely represent a geopolitical periphery of Europe—they have become a space where Europe’s internal dilemmas are most directly projected, including its stance on sovereignty, diversity, and democratic pluralism.
In parallel, two opposing security tendencies are emerging: on one side, the initiatives of Croatia, Albania, and the so-called Kosovo, which—with the support of the United States and NATO—are building a joint security space; on the other, the strategic rapprochement between Serbia and Hungary, based on the idea of preserving neutrality and stability despite increasing geopolitical pressure. However, it is important to note that both axes, despite their differences, rely on the existing NATO security infrastructure—indicating that even regional moves acknowledge the already established security structures. Rather than shaping a coherent regional policy, the European Union allows parallel logics of action to form within a framework that remains predominantly Western-centric and externally controlled.
In this vortex—where economic interests, demographic challenges, geopolitical ambitions, and security gaps intertwine and condition one another—the key question arises: does Europe possess the capacity to objectively assess and act upon its strategic relevance in a radically changing world? Instead of a sober assessment of reality, the Union increasingly retreats into the symbolic space of outdated narratives. Guided by its own illusions about its significance and capabilities, the European Union, through new initiatives for military strengthening, not only deepens internal contradictions but also fuels the radicalization of circumstances—both within its own borders and in the broader European and international context. By drifting away from its founding principles, it is gradually transforming into an instrument of political pressure, with the consequences of such actions increasingly threatening both its own foundations and the essential preconditions of international stability. Although it proclaims a desire for autonomy, its actions increasingly reflect deeply entrenched illusions about a significance that has historically eroded.
Antonio Gramsci emphasized that political maturity begins where “the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will” intersect—the ability to see reality without illusions, yet still act with resolve. Contemporary Europe, however, shows a deficit in both awareness and willpower, leaving the impression that the vortex in which it finds itself is not recognized as a crisis but accepted as the new normal. It is precisely this normalization of historical blindness that may prove to be its most costly strategic delusion. The greatest danger, as long noted, does not lie in what we do not know, but in what we believe we know. Europe, which now places greater trust in its own perception of itself rather than in objective reality, risks replacing its historical role with an illusion that is increasingly unsustainable—and may pay a high price for it.