The NATO summit, held in The Hague at the end of June, showed that hopes for de-escalation remained unfulfilled. Moreover, instead of reassessing the current approach, a course of further confrontation, accelerated militarization of Europe, and a reaffirmation of a consistent hardline stance toward Russia was adopted—even at the cost of internal divisions within Europe—which confirms that European policy since 2022 has continued to slide toward a dangerous line of conflict, without a clear exit strategy. As already reported in the media, based on Washington’s request, the central decision of the summit concerns a “historic agreement” to raise military spending to 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2035. However, the consensus was disrupted by Spain’s open opposition, which characterized the 5% of GDP as unsustainable for its own economy, as it would require either a drastic reduction in social spending or a dramatic increase in taxes. Spain’s unwillingness to spend vast sums on military expenditures points to broader negative implications and, more generally, to the economic sustainability of such a militaristic course.

Supporting this, Slovenian economist Igor Jurišič, in an analysis published on June 24, 2025, on the Slovenian portal Morel.si, titled “Za izpolnjevanje zahtev zveze NATO nam bodo vzeli vsako šesto plačo” (“To Meet NATO’s Demands, They’ll Take Every Sixth Paycheck from Us”), presented an illustrative estimate of the fiscal burden using Slovenia as an example. According to his analysis, Slovenia, with a GDP of 67 billion euros in 2024, currently allocates about 1.35% of its GDP to defense, which amounts to 900 million euros annually. Raising this to 5% of GDP would mean an increase in the military budget to about 3.35 billion euros, or an additional 2.45 billion euros every year. Jurišič translates this into the standard of living of citizens, pointing out that Slovenia’s 828,000 employed individuals would effectively have to pay nearly 3,000 euros more in taxes annually—close to two average monthly salaries (with the average salary at 1,526 euros), or, illustratively, “one out of every six paychecks goes to NATO”. Over a working period of 40 years, according to Jurišič’s analysis, an average married couple would contribute around 236,000 euros additionally to the military, which is equivalent to the price of a property in Ljubljana or Maribor.

Viewed from the perspective of Slovenia’s entire population, each citizen would pay the equivalent of 1,150 euros more per year for armaments, or about 90,000 euros over the average lifetime. The only ways to finance this, he notes, would be either to raise the value-added tax by 45% (which would increase VAT to as high as 67%) or to reduce pensions by around 37%. The conclusion of Jurišič’s analysis suggests that Slovenians would spend decades of their working lives repaying NATO obligations, while a significant portion of the money would flow out of the country to foreign arms manufacturers.

A similar calculation was presented by Croatian publicist Andrija Klarić in an analysis published at the end of June 2024 on the communication culture portal *Epoha*, in which he pointed out the potential fiscal consequences for his country. He states that Croatia currently spends around 1.7 billion euros annually on defense, while raising that to 5% of GDP for military purposes would amount to between 5.9 and 7.3 billion euros per year—depending on overall GDP growth—which would mean an additional 4 to 5.6 billion euros annually. Although these figures should be taken with caution, Croatia faces the risk of encountering the same problems as Slovenia, meaning that most of the additional funds would go to foreign arms suppliers. In other words, Croatian taxpayers would be financing someone else’s industry, while at home there would be reduced investment in healthcare, education or debt repayment. Klarić concludes that raising defense spending to 5% of GDP is neither fiscally sustainable nor strategically justified for Croatia.

Estimates from Slovenia and Croatia show that the newly imposed standards effectively nullify the economic sovereignty of smaller EU countries by tying their budgets to military spending. It is no coincidence that these criticisms have come specifically from smaller states, as their fiscal space is limited, and every additional expenditure painfully impacts the standard of living. While larger EU countries can more easily absorb increased allocations for military equipment, for economies like Slovenia’s or Croatia’s, this means sacrificing development policies and becoming dependent on foreign technologies.

Europe on a Warpath: Mines, Maneuvers, Mobilization

In addition to the economic burden, there is an increasingly visible physical preparation of the terrain for a potential conflict—the measures agreed upon at the summit unmistakably pave the way for a militarization of the European landscape unseen since the Cold War. In earlier texts, I addressed the intentions of certain states to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, and now we are already witnessing Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland entering the process of procuring and producing mines to block their borders with Russia and Belarus. Finland and Lithuania have gone the furthest, announcing plans to launch domestic mine production as early as 2026 for their own needs and for export to Ukraine. Lithuania has indicated it will spend hundreds of millions of euros on anti-tank as well as anti-personnel mines, ordering tens of thousands of units. The British newspaper The Telegraph described this trend with the headline: “Europe Is Building a New Iron Curtain – Out of a Million Mines,” stretching from Lapland in northern Finland to the Polish plain in the south.

For countries like Finland, which just a decade ago destroyed over a million mines to join the Ottawa Convention, this marks a dramatic reversal. In Eastern Europe, the sense of fear over possible Russian aggression is now being used as a basis for introducing measures that for decades were considered unacceptable—methods of warfare that were once banned as inhumane are making a return.

In addition to the mining of borders, NATO is also planning large-scale maneuvers on European soil. In September 2025, Germany will host a major logistical military exercise on its territory, titled “Red Storm Bravo”, focused on the rapid transfer of troops from west to east in the event of an attack on the Baltic states or Poland. Hamburg, a strategically important port, has been selected as the central hub for landing and transporting forces. According to the newspaper Bild, the scenario envisions the deployment of troops across the eastern flank, which serves as a rapid transit route from Germany to the Baltics under wartime conditions. According to some media reports, the exercise could involve up to 800,000 personnel from various military and logistical structures, which, if realized, would represent an unprecedented number in NATO’s recent history. A similar exercise in 2024 was smaller in scale but laid the groundwork for a scenario involving the mass reinforcement of forces from across Europe. While during the Cold War Germany was seen as the future battlefield, today, according to its military officials, it would serve as a rear logistical base for transferring NATO forces eastward.

This repositioning suggests that the potential frontline is shifting toward the Baltic states and Poland, reflecting the Alliance’s new operational priorities. In this context, General Christopher Donahue, Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, and also Commander of NATO’s Allied Land Command, presented a plan titled “Eastern Flank Deterrence Line”. This plan envisions the enhancement of land capabilities, standardized system integration, increased use of unmanned platforms, and full interoperability among member states. It is designed as an additional step in operationalizing the strategy of deterrence and rapid response along NATO’s eastern flank. In this regard, Donahue also emphasized that NATO now possesses the capability, in a hypothetical wartime scenario, to “neutralize” critical points such as Kaliningrad from land faster than ever before. Although this was not a direct threat but a demonstration of capabilities within the deterrence concept, such statements further reinforce the impression that strategic logic in Europe is shifting toward operational preparations for confrontation, rather than de-escalation.

The European Union in a Strategic Shadow

Although the “historic agreement” from the summit in The Hague was presented pompously, the event revealed the marginalization of the EU, since key decisions are made within NATO under Washington’s dominance, while the Union’s institutions are reduced to institutionally marginalized actors. Europe also realizes that it cannot industrially compete with American capabilities. President Trump’s insistence that European states purchase weapons from the U.S. relies on the reality that the European defense industry lacks the capacity to provide the necessary quantities of equipment in a short time. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as much as 64% of the weapons imported by European NATO members in the past five years come from the United States, representing an increase from 52% in the previous five-year period. In other words, nearly two-thirds of the funds European countries spend on armaments end up in the American military-industrial complex. This dependence is deepening further, placing Europe in an increasingly subordinate strategic and technological position.

While Europe financially feeds the American military-industrial complex, it becomes vulnerable to blackmail. Such actions directly threaten and undermine the proclaimed EU goals of European “strategic autonomy,” and instead of fostering a common defense industry itself, the EU finds itself forced to turn to urgent purchases from America to arm both itself and Ukraine. In this context, the signing of a bilateral security-defense strategic agreement between Germany and the United Kingdom on July 17 in London is particularly indicative. This is the first such agreement between the two countries since World War II and foresees, among other things, joint weapons development, deeper integration, and coordination within NATO. Although it is not a formal alliance, this move shows that the European security architecture is increasingly being shaped through extra-institutional formats, with key countries acting independently while EU institutions remain on the margins of the process.

The Impact of the European Strategic Crisis on the Balkans

Considering the military, economic, and political aspects, Europe finds itself in a strategic trap where both escalation and de-escalation carry high risks—the former threatens the collapse of economies and an almost certain military conflict, while the latter would mean internal acknowledgment of failure with serious consequences for the credibility of the EU and NATO. In such a context, the United States has managed to solidify its dominance over Europe in the security sphere by drawing it into a confrontation that, paradoxically, primarily harms Europe itself. What further complicates Europe’s position is the fact that its leaders, unfortunately, lack both vision and a clear strategy for escaping this dead end. Instead, there is an impression that an inertial policy prevails, hoping that escalated rhetoric and an expansion of armaments will lead to the desired outcome. But historical experience shows that such deadlock situations usually resolve either through escalation into armed conflict or through painful and politically costly acknowledgment of mistakes.

This strategic context thus becomes particularly relevant for Balkan countries such as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a time when Euro-Atlantic integration is being presented as the only option. EU and NATO members today face pressures and risks that were unimaginable just a few years ago. The prospect of small states joining an alliance that expects 5% of GDP to be allocated to armaments, accepting the obligation to participate in global confrontations (including a possible military conflict with China), and relinquishing their economic sovereignty certainly requires serious and strategically responsible reconsideration. The truth is that Euro-Atlantic integration has brought some benefits to certain countries—easier access to funds, markets, and certain standards. But if those benefits come at the cost of losing economic independence and being drawn into others’ conflicts, then a sober assessment is necessary: are we gaining security, or are we giving up sovereignty?

Membership in NATO would entail taking on a full spectrum of obligations—from deploying forces in the East (including the Pacific) to adapting national infrastructure to the standards and needs of the Alliance. While proponents of the Euro-Atlantic path often emphasize the advantages of membership, recent experiences also highlight its less visible side: obligations and restrictions that can have far-reaching consequences for the economy and overall autonomy in conducting national policies. For Balkan countries that still have a choice, it is wise to carefully analyze these ongoing trends. Europe’s strategic position is already poor. Therefore, lessons must be drawn in time: blindly rushing into integration without assessing the current context could mean being dragged into others’ conflicts and giving up hard-won sovereignty. The Europe that existed just a few years ago no longer exists, which should certainly be the subject of serious strategic assessment in all Balkan capitals considering their future relationship with NATO and the EU.