Exactly one month ago, on January 20 of this year, Donald Trump officially became the 47th President of the United States. While under different circumstances this first month in office would typically be a period of gradual transition and protocol-related activities, this cannot be said for the present case, given that this period has been marked by numerous actions of the new American administration, initiating profound, comprehensive and multidirectional changes aimed at the presumed goal of self-consolidation and revitalization. Such an approach reflects a strategic redirection, affecting the very core of the internal structure of the collective West while simultaneously redefining the role of the United States in the global order, which, following the Cold War, was predominantly shaped by its expansionist neoliberal globalist ideological framework.

Everything that accompanied Trump’s return to power has significantly influenced the pronounced aggressiveness of the new American administration in implementing its agenda, particularly in relation to its opponents—exponents of globalism—not only in the United States but also in Europe. This approach has already, even at this stage, directly contributed to undermining the presumed nature of Euro-Atlantic allied relations. This is evident in the U.S. administration’s announcements regarding the imposition of tariffs on the EU, its open support for Germany’s AfD, as well as statements by American officials at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, where sharp criticism was directed at European policies.

The rift in Euro-Atlantic relations widened further following the initiative and subsequent commencement of Russian-American negotiations on achieving peace in Ukraine, held in Saudi Arabia, to which neither Brussels nor Kyiv were invited. This exclusion provoked intense reactions from European politicians and a sense of panic due to the perceived humiliation. All these events served as a warning that Trump’s frequent statements about reassessing NATO’s purpose should be taken more seriously. While NATO, as a military-political organization whose members include most EU states, is unlikely to cease to exist, a redefinition of the U.S. role and a reduction in the size of the American military contingent within NATO on European soil can be expected. Such a shift would, in essence, diminish the Alliance’s operational combat capability.

Numerous indicators point to this conclusion, including the frequent statements by the U.S. administration regarding the necessity for European member states to increase their defense spending to 5% of their GDP while enhancing their defense capabilities—naturally, by purchasing American weapons and military equipment. Supporting this assertion are signals from the Russian-American negotiations that mention the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from NATO member states that joined after 1990. Additionally, the Pentagon’s announcement on February 19 regarding the need to reduce budget allocations for its own defense, in order to redirect funds toward the U.S. administration’s national defense priorities—primarily, as stated, for increased investments in the Indo-Pacific and the security of the U.S.-Mexico border—aligns with this shift. Military commands overseeing operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa are not exempt from these reduction plans. This approach suggests that the United States is returning to a more isolationist stance toward Europe.

It is essential to keep in mind that Europe’s marginalization is not merely a result of current circumstances but a natural consequence of its prolonged exposure to a dependent and subordinate position in relation to the United States. Nevertheless, despite this reality, official Brussels is increasingly striving to develop autonomous defense structures, even in the face of a marked decline in global competitiveness, recession, inflation, deindustrialization, a lack of innovation in modern technologies and artificial intelligence, limited access to affordable sources of raw materials and energy due to its own detrimental decisions, as well as negative demographic trends and migration processes. Unable to confront the reality of a new world in which the EU no longer represents a significant global factor, there is a growing frequency of unfounded political initiatives and superficial assessments, including, among other things, the notion of independent conventional European military forces as a counterbalance to Russia.

That European conventional military capabilities are insufficient and inadequate after decades of neglect, and that their political ideas and decisions are ill-conceived when advocating for initiatives involving European action without the United States, is also pointed out by retired Danish General Clemmesen, former commander of the Baltic Defence College, located in the Estonian city of Tartu. Having completed the Military Academy in Serbia, I served as an officer in the Army of the Republic of Srpska and was among those selected to attend and successfully complete the Command and Staff School at the Baltic Defence College. There, I acquired extensive knowledge, primarily in the planning and execution of military operations, precisely during the period when General Clemmesen was at the helm of this military educational institution.

As someone who matured and gained professional experience within NATO structures, Clemmesen provides various analyses and critical assessments on numerous issues in his writings, including the inferiority of today’s European military forces within the Alliance. In a recently published article, he criticized the proposal of former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen regarding the deployment of 50,000 to 100,000 European peacekeeping troops to Ukraine. According to Clemmesen, Rasmussen, despite his years at the helm of NATO, has demonstrated that he still fails to grasp the military realities of (European) member states. He argues that even if such a move were temporarily feasible, it would completely cripple the defense capabilities of the respective home countries.

When discussing NATO’s capabilities in Europe, General Clemmesen’s assessment of Europe’s misconceptions regarding the adequacy of Baltic defense is particularly illustrative. He highlights that these countries, with their small populations and limited resources, are expected to defend over 1,200 km of borders, which carries negative implications for the rest of the continent. Drawing parallels with the approach that dominated from the 1950s onward, he notes that NATO frontline states at the time—such as Denmark—received both weaponry and ammunition for their armed forces, with infrastructure being jointly funded, while they were responsible for providing manpower independently. However, contrary to this precedent, Clemmesen points out that nothing similar occurred when the Baltic states joined NATO, not even after 2014, when it was officially recognized that a territorial threat existed. They were not even advised to adopt the Finnish model and make full use of conscription.

At the time, as a military attaché in the Baltic states, Clemmesen conducted a comprehensive assessment of the border regions. According to his analysis, a minimum of one corps is required in each of the three countries, with three divisions in Estonia and Latvia, and four divisions in Lithuania. However, at present, Estonia has only two brigades, Latvia one, and Lithuania three. Given that the Baltic region is too exposed for sustained air operations, airspace security depends on the use of bases in Sweden, while logistical support and communication rely on protected maritime supply lines in the Baltic Sea. Summarizing his assessment, General Clemmesen argues that Russia could currently capture the Baltic states with a strategic strike, bypassing their limited national forces and the small NATO units deployed as part of the enhanced forward presence. Since no NATO member west of the Baltic states has retained territorial defense forces, everything depends on whether the Baltics can hold—if they fall, he believes, it is all over. In Clemmesen’s view, using Cold War-era structures and levels of readiness as an inspiration would have been a very good idea, but it is now too late. It would have been too late even if preparations had begun in 2014.

In light of the overall developments triggered by the new U.S. administration’s arrival to power, the observable changes are multidimensional in nature. It is evident that the consequences will negatively impact the European Union, which will be forced to find ways to position itself more favorably within the new constellation of global relations. This position will certainly not resemble the one that has defined its existence from its inception to the present and will require a shift in approach—both in the context of U.S.-Russia relations and in terms of an appropriate military response, as well as a range of issues that objectively burden its economy and social stability, threatening its decline.

Considering the new global realities and the challenges that characterize current Euro-Atlantic relations, the activities undertaken on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of NATO and EU membership should take these aspects into account to prevent a potentially disastrous scenario.